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Abstract. A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty
states that decentralisation oﬀers the possibility to learn from local or re-
gional policy experiments. We argue that such learning processes are not
trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to
retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumu-
late, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly
for complex issues if representatives’ actions are tightly controlled by the
electorate. Decentralisation provides improved learning processes compared
to unitary systems, but the results we can expect are far from the ideal
mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the
literature.
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In one of his most often-cited papers, Hayek (1968) argues that competi-
tion on the marketplace serves as a “discovery procedure” for new, previously
unknown problem-solving routines. With the argument being probably more
or less undisputed with regard to the market for private goods,
1 it has in the
meantime also been submitted with regard to public goods: Competition be-
tween jurisdictions is supposed to provide incentives both to conduct experi-
ments with new policy routines and to learn from experiments conducted in
other jurisdictions.
2
What is common among these approaches is the (not always explicit) pre-
sumption of a motivation of individuals to learn, i.e., individuals are assumed
to have some motivation to gather information on institutional evolution
or on the evolution of economic policy in other jurisdictions and update
their knowledge accordingly. For instance, in Vanberg/Kerber (1994)
this motivation is explained by referring to the private gains that can be
accrued from an eﬃciency-enhancing institutional change. This is certainly
very plausible when we are interested in individuals considering their “exit”-
option: If an individual considers herself mobile and has the option of leaving
1See, for instance, Kerber/Saam (2001) and the literature cited there for approaches
to the knowledge-generating problem on markets for private goods.
2See, for instance, Salmon (1987), Vihanto (1992) and Vanberg/Kerber (1994).
1jurisdiction A for jurisdiction B, and if she can gather information about
B at very low cost, then an individual obviously has an incentive to inform
herself about the real disposable income that she can earn in B.
This incentive disappears, however, when the option of mobility does not exist
and the only remaining option is “voice”. In this case and from the perspective
of one citizen-voter among many, a change of policy is a pure, Samuelsonian
public good. If there is not a suﬃciently high probability for a representative
citizen-voter to cast the decisive vote and if there are no external rewards for
a change of mind, then the individual has no obvious incentive to incur costs
to update her given, individual stock of economic policy-related knowledge.
This point, however, seems to be widely neglected in most of the available
literature on decentralised economic policy.
This paper intends to show that this lack of an incentive has important im-
plications for the theoretical concept of decentralised economic policy-making
as a discovery procedure. To be able to focus on collective learning processes
involving voters and citizens, we assume a tightly contolled government
throughout the paper. In other words, the policies preferred by the median
voter are executed frictionlessly and there are no control problems to be
solved. The argument will proceed as follows: In the following section, we
will introduce our assumptions regarding the behaviour of citizen-voters and
2governments and introduce two groups of citizens with diﬀerential inclina-
tions to utilise the “exit”- and “voice”-options. In section 3, a hypothetical,
yet very general starting point for factor migration will be introduced, and
section 4 discusses the incentives following from factor migration to critically
examine given policy routines and to experiment with new routines. Finally,
section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2. Individual uncertainty and the emergence of common beliefs
2.1. The dissemination of policy-related conjectures. The point of
departure of the argument presented here is fundamentally diﬀerent from
that of normative approaches to ﬁscal competition, which usually involve
omniscient maximisers of welfare, rents or something alike and ask whether
such a maximising eﬀort by a number of decentralised social planners leads
to a result that would be considered optimal by an omniscient, centralised
social planner. Instead of following this lead, the notion of model uncertainty
is used here: individuals are theoretically uncertain in the sense that they
do not know the true model describing the actual properties of the economy
within which they are acting and making decisions.
Because the quality of economic policy is a public good and because we assume
that there is a large number of citizens, so that the individual probability of
having the decisive vote is approximately zero, individuals do not feel a need
3to invest into acquiring “rational expectations” regarding economic policy, i.e.
to utilise all available information in order to gain the most precise theoretical
and empirical knowledge about their economy that can be gained at a given
point in time. Individuals might be expected to build rational expectations if
the necessary information was available costlessly and if it could be learned
eﬀortlessly. But both requirements are not met here.
Following Hirschman (1989), however, it is assumed that individuals do feel
an intrinsic need to have some point of view on issues of economic policy – but,
given the public good problem, they do not feel a need to take the scientiﬁcally
most up to date point of view. On the contrary, it is assumed that, once
individuals have learned a set of conjectures about diﬀerent economic policy
measures, they will attempt to retain them. To explain this tendency, assume
that at a time t0, a representative individual is completely uncertain and
has no a priori knowledge at all to fortify an opinion on economic policy.
Given his assumed intrinsic need for such an explanation, he will assume some
set of conjectures Ωn ∈ {Ω1,...,ΩN} that is supplied to him in the public
discourse. The supply side of the theory market is not explicitly modelled
here. It is convenient to simply assume that every Ωn is backed by some rent-
seeking organised interest group representing absentee interests and that all
interest groups are willing and able to invest an equal amount of resources
into convincing the public of their respective positions. These are certainly
4unrealistic assumptions, but they are introduced to model the supply side of
the theory market as simple as possible in order to focus on the demand side.
As a preliminary to explaining the choice of an Ωn, we assume for simpliﬁcation
that citizens are homogenous with regard to their maximand. They all wish to
maximise the same objective of economic policy, such as the level of disposable
income, employment, output growth rates or something alike. Since we focus
on the general learning process about economic policy measures and not on
some speciﬁc, well-deﬁned policy problem, we do not need to concern ourselves
with the details of the maximisation problem here and can simply assume that
there is a common maximisation problem which concerns economic policy-
makers and citizens.
In this case, a plausible criterion for choosing one Ωn among a possibly large
number N of available sets is the number of individuals who are already con-
vinced that Ωn gives an accurate description of the true working properties of
the economy. If one is completely uncertain about the relative accuracy of the
N available theories, then the number of individuals who already hold an Ωn
may be interpreted by the individual as a signal for its usefulness relative to
the other sets. It also may be the case that the uncertain citizen decides upon
choosing an Ωn following personal communication with other, already decided
5individuals. In this case, the probability that the uncertain individual com-
municates with an individual advocating Ωn will usually also depend on the
fraction of already decided individuals who adhere to that set of conjectures.
Thus, it should be possible to model the individual choices of conjectures
about economic policy as a frequency-dependent process:3 A relatively large
number of individuals who already hold an Ωn reassures an uncertain indi-
vidual that Ωn is not an obscure, but a reasonable choice. One tool among
others to model such processes of frequency-dependent self-organisation is
the generalised Polya process, as proposed by Arthur et al. (1985) and





















which simply states that the expected value of the fraction 0 ≤ wn ≤ 1 of
individuals in the population of already decided individuals who adhere to an
Ωn at a time t + 1, given its fraction at a time t, depends primarily on just
that wn
t and on an arbitrary, upward-sloping function qn
t (wn
t ). Time in this
3To some degree, there is obviously a similarity to Kuran (1987) here, in the sense that
individuals decide on taking a certain position according to the number of other individuals
who already hold that position. The important diﬀerence, however, is that in our model
there is no place for preference falsiﬁcation: There is no diﬀerence between what individuals
privately believe in and what they publicly advocate. Nevertheless, the result, for which
Kuran coined the term “collective conservativism”, will be quite similar.
6model is equal to the numbers of individuals who have decided themselves for
any Ωn, i.e., it is assumed that at any point in time exactly one individual
decides which theory to choose. The parameter m stands for the number of
individuals who were already decided at t = 0 and henceforth, we will simply
assume m = N, with the underlying assumption that every Ω is backed by
exactly one individual. The condition for an equilibrium is easily inferred
from (1): There is no expected change in the value of the fraction of Ωn if
E[wn
t+1|wn
t ] − wn
t = 0, which is the case if and only if qn
t (wn
t ) − wn
t = 0.4
2.2. Choice and equilibria on a theory market with heterogeneous
individuals. The piece that is still missing in our depiction of the market
for theories on economic policy is a set of assumptions on the shape of the
function qn
t (wn
t ), assigning a probability for the next uncertain individual to
choose Ωn to the current market share of this theory, wn
t . If we were only
interested in the choice of an average individual and, in accordance with the
preceding discussion, presupposed that the average indivual follows the ma-
jority in assuming an opinion on economic policy, the matter would be rather
simple: The ﬁrst individual at t0 would choose randomly one Ω∗ among all
available theories and unconstrained herding behaviour would lead all follow-
ing individuals to choose exactly the same Ω∗. The process would be locked
4For technical proofs regarding the existence and the (in-)stability of equilibria of a
generalised Polya process, the reader is referred to the original work of W. Brian Arthur,
Yuri M. Ermoliev and Yuri M. Kaniovski.
7in on a path towards a stable equilibrium with w(Ω∗) = 1 immediately af-
ter the ﬁrst individual has made his random decision. Obviously, the result-
ing complete consensus among individuals regarding their beliefs about the
proper economic policy contradicts even casual empirical evidence.
As an alternative, consider the situation when individuals are heterogeneous
regarding their tendency to follow the majority. Let α denote the individual
tendency to be conformist, with an α ≤ 0 signifying a very conformist indi-
vidual who always chooses the majority opinion and an α ≥ 1 signiﬁying a
very nonconformist individual who always chooses the minority opinion. Val-
ues of α ∈ (0,1) reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of conformism, with the actual choice
depending on w. Furthermore, let Ω∗




t = arg max
Ω∈{Ω1,...,ΩN}
wt(Ω). (2)
If there is no unique Ω∗
t, but a set of equally popular theories, then Ω∗
t is
chosen randomly from this set, with equal probabilities of choice attached to
each equally popular theory. Then we can assume individuals to value the
available theories according to (3):
v(Ω) =

   
   
(1 − α) · w(Ω) if Ω = Ω∗
t
α · w(Ω) if Ω 6= Ω∗
t
(3)
and to simply choose that Ωv that maximises their individual v(Ω). Again,
if there is no unique Ωv but a set of theories that yield equal values, the
8individual is assumed to choose randomly with equal probabilities from the
theories in this set.
With these assumptions made, the theory market is determined to eﬀectively
collapse from an arbitrarily high number N of available theories to N =
2 after the ﬁrst suﬃciently nonconformist individual has made his choice.
To illustrate this point, suppose that the ﬁrst individual to decide randomly
chooses a theory which subsequently becomes Ω∗. If the next individual to
decide is suﬃciently conformist, he will pick the same Ω∗ and all other Ω 6= Ω∗
remain equally valued. As soon as a suﬃciently nonconformist individual
appears, who rejects the majority theory, he will choose among those equally
valued minority theories. But when one minority theory, let it be denoted by
Ωm, is picked by a nonconformist individual, it will become the preferred choice
for all other, later deciding nonconformists. This follows from (3), simply
because w(Ωm) > w(Ω)∀Ω 6= Ω∗,Ωm. Therefore, all nonconformists appearing
at later stages of the process will also choose Ωm, while all conformists will
choose the majority theory Ωv. The market shares of all other theories will
tend towards zero with more and more individuals deciding between Ωv and
Ωm.
Therefore, extreme and deliberate obscurantism is excluded from the model.
Even people who have a strong enough nonconformist tendency to pick the
minority theory have a preference to be in a larger minority group, rather
9than a smaller minority group. A diﬀerent interpretation may view Ωm as a
reservoir of heterogeneous nonconformists. In this case, all individuals who
decide to disagree with Ω∗ gather within a group adhering to Ωm, where Ωm is
not deﬁned as a coherent theory itself, but as an amalgam of diverse theories
whose common ground is the rejection of the majority theory.




   
   
(1 − α) · w(Ω∗)
α · w(Ωm),
(3a)
and the α for which an individual is just indiﬀerent between conformism and





t→∞ ¯ α = w(Ω
∗). (4)
The convergence in time of ¯ α towards w(Ω∗) follows simply from the fact
that, once they are determined, only the majority theory and the preferred
minority theory are chosen, so that the added market shares of these theories
tend towards one. Knowing this, and knowing that the probability that an
Ω 6= Ω∗,Ωm is chosen at this stage of the process is zero, the theory market is
now restricted to Ω∗ and Ωm and w∗
t + wm
t = 1 is assumed to hold. From (4)
and assuming that an individual shuns the majority only if he clearly values
being a nonconformist higher than being a conformist, we can derive a simple
decision rule for uncertain individuals:
10If α ≤ ¯ α: choose Ω∗ (Be a conformist)
If α > ¯ α: choose Ωm (Be a nonconformist).
To ﬁnally write down the q-function of the Polya-process discussed here,
suppose that values of α (i.e., degrees of conformism) are normally distributed
over the population with mean µ = 0.5 and an arbitrary standard deviation
σ. Given the simple decision rule, we can then state that as soon as Ω∗ and
Ωm are selected from the N available theories, we have as probabilities of














m = 1 − q
∗. (6)
This leads to a characteristic sigmoidal graph for the two q-functions. Given
that there is a positive probability that an individual has an α < 0 or an
α > 1, it follows that q∗(0) > 0, q∗(1) < 1, qm(0) > 0 and ﬁnally qm(1) < 1.
The numerical values depend on σ; a rise of σ, would reﬂect a growing number
of extreme conformists and nonconformists in the population. Such a change
in the composition of the population is not modelled in this paper, however:
σ is assumed to be constant.
The relationship between the actual fraction w∗
t and the probability q∗
t of the
next individual also choosing Ω∗ is depicted graphically in Figure 1. There
are two stable equilibria for w∗ on this theory market, one at w∗
1 and one at
w∗











Figure 1. Equilibria on the theory market
than the actual fraction w∗




lower for an interval where w∗
t > w∗
1,3. The attracting intervals are delimited
by the unstable equilibrium at w∗
2 = µ = 0.5. For any w∗
t < w∗
2, the process
will converge towards w∗
1 and for any w∗
t > w∗
2 it will converge towards w∗
3.
Since Ω∗ has been deﬁned the majority theory at the outset, we can expect
its market share to converge towards w∗
3 without further interventions into
the process; the market share of the preferred minority theory Ωm will then
converge towards wm = 1 − w∗
3 if the process runs long enough to make the
N − 2 other theories that competed on the market at the outset negligible.
3. Interjurisdictional labour and capital markets
3.1. Three variants of mobility. As a preliminary to the introduction of
interjurisdictional labour and capital markets, we will introduce three diﬀer-
ent types of mobility that are assumed to be found within our population.
12Suppose that individuals can develop loyalty towards the jurisdiction they
live in, and suppose further that this loyalty depends on the concurrence
between the policy-related theory an individual believes in and the policy
that is actually conducted. Deliberately ignoring the control problem and
assuming economic policy to be always perfectly in line with the median
voter’s preferences, the group of individuals who do in fact experience such
a concurrence are the supporters of Ω∗. The median voter can never be a
supporter of Ωm. Thus, the loyal individuals will always be the individuals
who believe in the majority theory, while the illoyal individuals will be those
who have assumed the preferred minority theory.
The concept of loyalty here simply means that an individual is not only in-
terested in his real disposable income, but also in the policy conducted in his
jurisdiction: A loyal individual can gain a utility u(x) > 0 from the policy,
depicted by the vector x, that is conducted in his polity and that is not con-
tradicting the Ω∗ of this polity. For an illoyal individual, we will always have
u(x) = 0: The illoyal individual has abandoned any pondering about policy
and restricts his attention to his disposable income. He has no directly policy-
related preferences and therefore, he receives neither a utility, nor a disutility
from the economic policy itself. If, however, a loyal individual who by deﬁ-
nition is directly interested in economic policy, experiences (maybe due to an
accidental error on behalf of the governing) a policy x that contradicts Ω∗,
then he will experience a disutility u(x) < 0.
13Further, it is assumed that both loyal and illoyal individuals are not behaving
as permanent maximisers, but as satisﬁcers. Generally, the aspiration level of
the loyal individuals may be written as δL = ¯ y + ¯ u(x), where ¯ y is a long-run
weighted average of the individual’s past real disposable incomes, which he at
least expects to earn in the future, and ¯ u(x) is the minimum utility a loyal
individual wishes to gain from economic policy itself. Given the discussion in
the last paragraph, we will simply assume that ¯ u(x) = 0, i.e., the individual
wishes at least not to experience a direct disutility from economic policy.
The illoyal individual, on the other hand, uses the time and eﬀort that the
loyal individual invests into domestic policy to screen his income-generating
opportunities in other jurisdictions. He is always informed about the highest
level of attainable income in other jurisdictions, y∗, and accordingly sets δI =
y∗.
Therefore, the illoyal individual will out-migrate whenever y < y∗, while the
loyal individual will not consider migration unless y < ¯ y−u(x), i.e., a positive
direct utility from economic policy can compensate for a lower than expected
income. Henceforth, we will assume that y + u(x) > ¯ y always holds, which
leads to the factual immobility of loyal individuals. Finally, we assume that a
positive share 0 < γ < 1 of illoyal individuals is socially tied to loyal individ-
uals and therefore also factually immobile. This share of illoyal individuals,
deprived of their exit-option, is assumed to substitute voice for exit. They do
not consent to Ω∗ and, not being able to migrate but interested in earning a
14y∗ > y, they instead broker information about other jurisdictions’ economic
policies leading to y∗ to their loyal companions, who would not be interested
in y∗ by themselves.
3.2. Signals produced by decentralised policy. To investigate the sig-
nals produced by factor migration, we introduce probably the simplest equi-
librium conditions available in the literature on decentralised ﬁscal policy.
We assume that individuals supply homogeneous labor and own homogeneous
capital. They allocate their factors between two regions, A and B, with the
private sectors in both regions being characterised by standard, neoclassical
production functions. Adding to this, we assume that the vector x = (λ,θ,G)
comprises the policy conducted by the public sector with θ denoting a head
tax, G denoting the quantity of a public good and λ denoting the technology
used to provide the public good. Presuming a perfectly controlled government
which frictionlessly enforces the median voter’s preferred policy in order
to suppress control problems, the entire tax revenue is used to provide
productive public goods and no rents are accrued by individuals in the public
sector. Public policy enters the private sector production function through
a function ρ(x) with ρ > 0∀x. The eﬀect of ρ(x) is exactly the same as
that of a Hicks-neutral, factor-augmenting public input. Thus, the complete
production function for each of the two jurisdictions m ∈ A,B is
Y = ρ(xm) · F(Lm,Km). (7)
15Individuals are assumed to be uncertain regarding the function ρ(x), and
uncertainty here implies not only parameter uncertainty, but also uncertainty
regarding the functional form of ρ – in other words, individuals act under
model uncertainty and are compelled to act upon fallible hypotheses about
the eﬀects of policy changes on the aggregate output and on the marginal
productivities of labour and capital.
Since we assume a perfectly controlled government and exclude rent-seeking
activities, it is evident that the entire tax revenue is used to provide the public
good G. The eﬀective level of G, however, is assumed to also depend upon the
technology of public good provision, which is represented by the technology
parameter λ > 0, so that
G = λθL. (8)
In essence, the choice of policy can then be reduced to a choice of a tax rate
θ and of a technology λ, with the level of public goods being fully determined
by these parameters. In our context, the term technology is supposed to
encompass a wide range of real-world phenomena: not only physical means of
production, but also a the composition of a portfolio of diﬀerent types of public
goods. For instance, a relatively low value for λ could signify an excessive
emphasis on redistibutive activities compared to eﬃciency-enhancing public
capital, whereas a relatively high value for λ signiﬁes the opposite. This rather
16imprecise account of possible inﬂuences on λ mirrors the problem of model
uncertainty that the individuals in the model face.5
With a production function that is linear-homogeneous and factors being paid












Capital is always assumed to be perfectly mobile and A and B are assumed to
be small in relation to the world capital market, so that the net income from
capital in both A and B always equals the world rate of return r∗. As far
as labour is concerned, we assume no mobility at all at the initial stage (e.g.,
due to laws preventing migration) and introduce mobility between A and B
subsequently.
Suppose that B is the relatively eﬃcient region, i.e., the same amount of public
goods is ﬁnanced in B with a lower tax rate, or a higher amount of public
5Since the policy-space is not one-dimensional here, involving the choice of λ and θ, this
would traditionally contradict the stability of a median-voter equilibrium and therefore the
assumption of a tightly controlled government frictionlessly following the median prefer-
ences. Note, however, that stability here eﬀectively comes from the theory market, where
majority preferences are clearly deﬁned in a stable equilibrium.
17goods is, due to a more advanced technology, ﬁnanced with the same tax rate
in B, compared to A. At the initial stage, before labour mobility is introduced,
we thus have higher net incomes from labour in the low-tax jurisdiction B,
lB > lA. This is the ﬁrst type of signal produced by decentralised economic
policy, namely a price signal, which sends two messages: (i) given the current
policies, a positive number of units of labour could be utilised more eﬃciently
in B than in A and (ii) the policies in A and B lead to diﬀerent incomes from
supplying labour. This type of signal will henceforth be called a diﬀerential
signal. If we also introduce labour mobility, then this will obviously lead to
a change of lA and lB, as labour and capital migrate out of A into B. An
equilibrium on the interregional labour and capital markets is reached when
both conditions lA = lB and kA = kB = r∗ hold simultaneously.
The sign of the impact of migration on lA and lB is not determined in this
















and, depending on the actual functional form of ρ(x), there may exist intervals
for L where the positive ﬁrst term overcompensates the negative second term.
A migration of productive factors from the relatively ineﬃcient region A to
the relatively ineﬃcient region B then leads to a rise of lA via the direct eﬀect
of out-migration on marginal productivity, but it also leads to less capital
18being used in A and to a decline of ρ(x) via a loss of tax revenue. Similarly,
an inﬂow of additional units of labour to B would then lead to a decline
of marginal labour productivity, but that would be overcompensated by the
positive eﬀects generated by the additional productive public input ﬁnanced
with an enlarged tax base. It is therefore not ex ante clear whether the net
eﬀect of migration on the net incomes in A and B will be positive or negative.
This ambiguity of the eﬀects on labour income leads to four diﬀerent scenarios,
which are summarised in Table 1.
Scenario I II III IV
lA > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
lB > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Table 1: Possible reactions of
wages to factor migration.
While the diﬀerential signal results from given prices, we observe here changing
prices of labour in A and B resulting from a regional shifting of resources. Such
signals associated with price changes will thus be called shift signals.
Note that a reliable equilibriating tendency is asscociated only with scenario
II. In scenario III, there is a clear disequilibriating tendency resulting from
factor migration, and in the other two scenarios the existence of an equilibrium
depends on the relative velocity of the income eﬀects of migration. If the
marginal eﬀect of migration on marginal productivity and on the tax base in B
are consistently smaller than that in A, then there will be a tendency towards
19an equilibrium, associated with higher (I) or lower (IV) incomes in both A
and B. However, given the fact that there is a group of immobile individuals
in our model, factor migration can come to a rest even with persisting income
diﬀerentials.
4. Learning from another jurisdiction’s policies
4.1. Collective learning on the theory market. It is one of the delightful
properties of the generalised Polya process that the q-function is allowed to
change over time, and a change of the q-function obviously implies a change
of the equilibria of the self-organising process on the theory market. This
allows for experience to have an impact on the equilibirum. At the outset,
before experience was considered, µ = 0.5 was assumed, i.e., individuals are
assumed to be symmetrically distributed along the lines of conformism and
nonconformism. But it appears to be a plausible assumption that µ changes
when, grounded in experience, individuals have reason to believe that Ω∗ is
faulty.
If a policy based upon the majority theory produces disappointing results,
we should expect that for individuals who still have to decide themselves, the
propensity to be a conformist is reduced. The more implausible the theory
appears in the light of evidence, the higher would the internal costs – e.g.,
cognitive dissonance – be that have to be beared when such a theory is held.
20But this necessitates high external beneﬁts – a large and inﬂuential network
of similarly thinking individuals – to make the relatively implausible theory
nevertheless the preferred choice. The more contradictory the evidence is, the
higher w(Ω∗) has to be in order to induce a conformist choice. In other words,
µ rises when the majority theory grows dubious.
In Figure 1, such an increase of µ results in a shift of the q-function to the
right. This implies at least that the attracting region of w∗
3 decreases and
that w∗
3 moves to the left. If the shift goes far enough, the set of equilibria
on the theory market shrinks to w∗
1. In this case, the self-organisation process
on the theory market leads to a collapse of the social networks supporting Ω∗
and the minority theory, Ωm takes its place as the new majority theory. Once





2, we can assume the distribution of α to normalise
again with µ = 0.5. A change of collective opinion thus simply follows from a
temporary rise of nonconformism, which enters the model as a rise of µ for a
transitory period.
The actual learning process can then be expected to set in amongst the re-
maining supporters of the now dethroned Ω∗
1, who have just experienced their
set of conjectures to be gravely inept and who saw the social network sup-
porting their conjectures collapse to a small number of staunch believers. In
this situation, they are unlikely to give up their entire set of conjectures –
21they are staunch believers, after all – but it is obvious that the vast majority
of individuals has lost conﬁdence, so that some revision of the falsiﬁed set of
conjectures is necessary to be able to regain popularity and inﬂuence. The
supporters of the now popular Ω∗
2 on the other hand have no reason to revise
their theories. Having gained popularity and inﬂuence and having seen the ri-
val Ω∗
1 fail, their conﬁdence is likely to be bolstered and reasons for scepticism
are scarce. Thus, while Ω∗
2 is stabilised, Ω∗
1 is likely to change syncretically,
and this hints at the fact that collective learning is to be seen as a piecemeal
process where novel conjectures are slowly incorporated into given theories.
4.2. Learning from diﬀerential signals. What seems particularly appeal-
ing about learning from diﬀerential signals is that individuals can learn from
the policies conducted in neighbouring jurisdictions without the occurrence
of any potentially distorting spatial factor movements. This is what, among
others, Besley/Case (1995) have empirically analysed under the term
“yardstick competition”. On ﬁrst sight, the evidence is encouraging as far as
the usefulness of yardstick competition as a learning mechanism is concerned:
“Voters are able to appraise incumbents’ relative performance. From the
media or other sources, voters can gain access to information about what
other incumbents are doing, which serves as a benchmark for their own
jurisdiction” (Besley/Case (1995: 30)). Besley and Case do indeed show
that voters tend to deny re-election to incumbents who raise taxes while their
22colleagues in neighbouring jurisdictions do not, while they tend to accept tax
raises when neighbouring governments also raise taxes.6
The problem is, however, that while yardstick competition functions for the
tax rate, it fails for other issues of economic policy: for regionally diﬀering
income levels and unemployment rates, Besley and Case ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the individuals’ voting decisions. This is a somewhat puzzling
result: if voters learn from the comparison of regionally diﬀering tax policies,
and a lone tax raise is deciphered as a sign for ineﬃciency, then why does
the same mechanism not work for other ﬁelds of policy? The discussion in
the preceding subsection has shown that once the theory market within one
jurisdiction is out of equilibrium due to rising nonconformism, some collective
learning initiated by the losers of this transition can be expected. But the
underlying problem is if and under which conditions decentralised policy can
be expected to disturb the peace of local theory markets.
The evidence from Besley and Case cited in the above subsection is clearly
to be categorised as learning from diﬀerential signals. Yardstick competition
implies that only the fact that policies and results in one jurisdiction are dif-
ferent from those in another jurisdiction is used to learn about the relative
6The presumption that yardstick competition plays a role in determining tax rates is also
supported by evidence for tax mimicking in other countries than the United States, as for
instance Revelli (2001, 2002) shows for the United Kingdom, Heyndels/Vuchelen
(1997) show for Belgium and Feld/Reulier (2003) for Switzerland.
23usefulness of economic policies – information ﬂows across borders, while pro-
ductive factors not necessarily do so. In our model, these streams of informa-
tion about the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent policies meet a population that
is mostly characterised by a rather limited propensity to care for such infor-
mation. Considering themselves to be immobile, loyal individuals have prin-
cipally no interest at all to invest into gathering information from other ju-
risdictions: being reluctant to migrate, they have no private beneﬁts to gain
from monitoring policy in other jurisdictions. And being part of a social net-
work that stabilises their given majority conjectures Ω∗, they are most likely
also reluctant to critically compare Ω∗ to the theories that underlie policies in
other jurisdictions.
By assumption, there is, however, always also a share of illoyal, yet immobile
individuals in every jurisdiction. These are individuals who do not feel at-
tached to the jurisdiction they live in as such, who oppose the given Ω∗, but
who for some reason are not able or willing to migrate to another jurisdic-
tion. This opposition, if it manages to organise in parties or interest groups,
may serve as a channel to diﬀuse information about the policies in other juris-
dictions within the own population, in order to weaken the popular support
for Ω∗. The aim is to raise the level of nonconformism, µ, possibly above the
critical mark where the stable equilibrium at w∗
3 in ﬁgure 1 disappears. Thus,
24internal heterogeneity of jurisdictions can be seen as an important prerequi-
site to initiate collective learning processes. In the Tiebout world, which con-
sists of jurisdictions with internally homogeneous populations, this inlet for
information from outside is missing. If there were internally completely ho-
mogeneous populations in the model presented here, diﬀerential signals would
most probably be blinded out in order to stabilise a given consensus theory.
Nevertheless, even in a heterogeneous community learning from diﬀerential
signals involves barriers that prevent the collective learning processes from
being perfect mimicking mechanisms capable of ﬁnding the most eﬃcient
policy and implementing it wherever this would be reasonable. With social
networks that are working to stabilise their respective conjectures, it is
unlikely that all the diﬀerential signals from outside that are available and
contradict the majority theory do indeed lead to a destabilisation of the
equilibrium on the theory market. If the signal that lB > lA is received
in A, the underlying diﬀerences of Ω∗
A and Ω∗
B still have to be brought
to public attention, which is usually scarce. Moreover, it is often possible
to “explain” such a diﬀerential signal and at the same time maintain the
relatively ineﬃcient Ω∗
A if one accepts convenient auxiliary hyptheses, which
may for example hint at principal diﬀerences between jurisdictions A and B,
so that they are perceived as uncomparable.
25Furthermore, it may be the case that some issues are easier to bring to public
attention than other issues. Some issues, such as tax policy, may be more
salient in the public discourse because observing and comparing tax rates is a
matter of relatively low complexity while, for example, comparing technologies
of public good production or expenditure structures in budgets is a matter that
is much more costly to communicate and, more importantly, costly to learn
about. To sum up, learning from diﬀerential signals alone in a decentralised
setting is a highly imperfect mechanism of collective learning about the relative
eﬃciency of policies. It is, however, easy to see that it should still be superior
to a completely centralised framework. There, the diﬀerential signal does
not even exist. There is only one laboratory where policy experiments can
be conducted. But such an experiment is much less likely to happen in a
centralised setting, because instability on the theory market is less likely to be
induced without signals from outside. With every step of centralisation, policy
experiments occur less often in time and in a fewer number of jurisdictions.
4.3. Learning from shift signals. For price signals following from a shift
of productive factors from the relatively ineﬃcient to the relatively eﬃcient
region, generally the same statement holds as for the diﬀerential signals: they
are unreliable if one expects them to induce eﬃcient learning processes. Ta-
ble 1 shows that, if one does not enforce restrictive assumptions, the sign of
the eﬀect of migration out of the relatively ineﬃcient region on net wages is
26not fully determined. A larger tax base allowing to ﬁnance more productive
infrastructure may overcompensate the direct eﬀect on marginal labour pro-
ductivity, or it may not. In the relatively ineﬃcient region, net incomes may
rise as a result of out-migration if the public goods eﬀect does not overcom-
pensate the direct eﬀect on marginal productivity.
If there are barriers to migration at the outset and if these are lifted, migration
out of the relatively ineﬃcient and into the relatively eﬃcient region may
therefore lead to perverse incentives for collective learning. If scenarios I or II
occur, the remaining individuals in the relatively ineﬃcient region experience
a raise of their incomes after labour mobility is implemented. This signal, on
its own, is certainly not the right incentive to revise the relatively ineﬃcient
Ω∗
A. A satisﬁcer, who beneﬁts from his income rising above his aspiration
level, there is little reason to increase his scepticism and nonconformism in
such a scenario.
In scenarios II and IV , perverse incentives are also present for individuals
in the relatively eﬃcient region B, as they experience a decline of their net
incomes as a result of incoming migration from A. In this case, the trend of net
incomes as a result of migration is unsettling for the wrong individuals, namely
those who hold the relatively more eﬃcient conjectures. Only in scenario III
are the eﬀects of migration on net incomes suitable to set incentives for eﬃcient
collective learning processes.
27These problems may be reduced if individuals learn from both type of signals
considered here. To also reckon that the level of incomes is higher in B than it
is in A is certainly an improvement compared to an exclusive reliance on the
shift signals. Especially in scenarios that imply a further divergence of income
levels, the additional information would enforce justiﬁed scepticism in A. If
there is no divergence, though, then a convergence of income levels can easily
serve as an argument to defend Ω∗
A: if the income level in B is decreasing, then
this can be easily interpreted as an indicator that, for instance, circumstances
have changed and Ω∗
B is out of time.
Thus, there is even more information necessary to ensure that individuals have
the correct incentives. They have to know the diﬀerential signal, the shift
signal and they have to reckon that the shift signal follows from migration
and that migration out of A is a sign of relative ineﬃciency of Ω∗
A. This
may be trivial for an economist – but for an individual who defends his set
of conjectures behind a veil of insigniﬁcance and within a stabilising social
network, a willingness to face the facts cannot be simply presupposed.
Nevertheless, from a knowledge-producing perspective, decentralisation is still
preferred to centralisation. Decentralisation delivers a systematic tendency to
destabilise equilibria on the theory market. Even if this does not necessarily
occur in the correct (the ineﬃcient) jurisdiction, a change of Ω∗
B would also
produce new knowledge about the eﬃcacy of economic policies. A unitary
28system is missing this inherent instability that comes with the signals discussed
here and is thus bound to produce less knowledge.
5. Conclusion and outlook
It has been argued that under decentralised economic policy-making, more
knowledge about the relative eﬃcacy of diﬀerent theories underlying policies
is produced compared to unitary systems. The problem is only that incentives
to revise a given set of conjectures and thus to experiment with new policies
are not necessarily to be found in the relatively ineﬃcient region. While more
knowledge is produced in decentralised systems, it cannot be ensured that
there is a frictionless diﬀusion process where the relatively eﬃcient policy is
adopted by all jurisdictions.
Somewhat surprisingly, this result has also an encouraging facet, because di-
versity of policies is likely to be sustained. There is no ex post harmonisation
towards one eﬃcient policy, but rather an ongoing process where distorted
equilibria on the theory market lead to a continuing revision of theories,
which in turn leads to experiments with new policies. In this process, an
abrupt disappearance of theories in unlikely, and a syncretic change in which
small, seemingly successful elements of policies in other jurisdictions are
incorporated into one’s own theories are more probable.
29As far as future research is concerned, the discussion hints at the fact that de-
centralisation as a knowledge-generating process may be made more eﬃcient
if it comes with supporting institutions that set incentives for the electorate
to gather more information than it is assumed in the present paper. Empir-
ical research shows that such incentives may for example come from direct
democracy,7 so the interaction between institutions allowing for a large extent
of political participation and decentralisation may be a worthwhile subject of
future research.
6. References
Arthur, W. Brian (1988). “Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics”, in: Philip
Anderson, Kenneth J. Arrow and David Pines (eds.), The Economy as an
Evolving Complex System, Reading (Mass.): Addison Wesley.
Arthur, W. Brian/Yuri M. Ermoliev/Yuri M. Kaniovski (1985). “Path-Dependent
Processes and the Emergence of Macro Structure”, European Journal of Operations
Research 30: 294-303.
Benz, Matthias/Alois Stutzer (2002). “Are Voters Better Informed when They Have
a Larger Say in Politics?”, forthcoming in Public Choice.
Besley, Timothy/Anne Case (1995). “Incumbent Behaviour: Vote-Seeking, Tax-
Setting and Yardstick Competition”, American Economic Review 85: 25-45.
Feld, Lars P./Emmanuelle Reulier (2003). Strategic Tax Competition in Switzer-
land: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons, mimeo., Philipps-University Marburg
and University of Rennes 1.
Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1968). Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, Kieler
Vortr¨ age, N.F. 56, Kiel: Institut f¨ ur Weltwirtschaft.
Heyndels, Bruno/Jef Vuchelen (1997). “Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipali-
ties”, National Tax Journal 51: 89-101.
Hirschman, Albert O. (1989). “Having Opinions: One of the Elements of Well-Being?”,
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 79: 75-79.
Kerber, Wolfgang/Nicole J. Saam (2001). “Competition as a Test of Hyptheses:
Simulation of Knowledge-Generating Market Processes”, Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies
and Social Simulation 4, Issue 3.
Kuran, Timur (1987). “Preference Falsiﬁcation, Policy Continuity and Collective Con-
servativism”, Economic Journal 97: 642-665.
Revelli, Federico (2001). “Spatial Patterns in Local Taxation: Tax Mimicking or Error
Mimicking?”, Applied Economics 33: 1101-7.
7See Benz/Stutzer (2002).
30Revelli, Federico (2002). “Testing the Tax Mimicking versus Expenditure Spill-over
Hypothesis Using English Data”, Applied Economics 34: 1723-32.
Salmon, Pierre (1987). “Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme”, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 3: 24-43.
Vanberg, Viktor A./Wolfgang Kerber (1994). “Institutional Competition Among
Jurisdictions: An Evolutionary Approach”, Constitutional Political Economy 5: 193-219.
Vihanto, Martti (1992). “Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery Pro-
cedure”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148: 411-436.
31